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Introduction
The completion of the single European Market in the early 1990s removed the barriers to cross-border shopping but left the right to set indirect taxes mostly at the level of the individual Member States. As a consequence, economists have extensively studied tax competition in indirect taxes for cross-border shoppers from a theoretical perspective, cf. Kanbur and Keen (1993) , Nielsen (2001 Nielsen ( , 2002 , as well as empirically, cf. Lockwood and Magali The present study considers the implications of cross-border shopping for optimal direct taxation and governments'capabilities to implement incentivecompatible redistributive taxation. More speci…cally, we investigate the role of cross-border shopping for the validity of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem.
In their seminal contribution, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , henceforth AS, showed that commodity taxation cannot improve e¢ ciency, if preferences are separable in labor and consumption, and the government implements an optimal non-linear direct taxation scheme. This result is compatible with any level of uniform commodity taxation in a closed economy setting, which makes the AS result one of the most policy relevant optimal taxation results, since it provides a theoretically sound argument for uniform commodity taxation. Accordingly, many scholars have scrutinized its scope and robustness. Naito (1999) showed that the result no longer applies, if wages are determined endogenously. Saez (2004) , however, demonstrated that it can be restored if human capital formation is also made endogenous. Similarly, Cremer et al. (2001) have considered the implications of di¤erent wealth endowments, and Boadway and Pestieau (2003) analyze the robustness of the AS result to various other assumptions, such as di¤erences in needs, di¤erent types of labor, or household production. Finally, Kaplow (2006) , and Laroque (2005) , have further extended the arguments in favor of uniform taxation showing that direct taxes must not necessarily be chosen optimally for the AS result to apply.
The existing literature has typically maintained the closed economy setting. Given the increasing market integration in Europe, and elsewhere, we depart from the closed economy assumption and analyze the implications of cross-border shopping and tax competition for the AS result. Our key research question is, whether the additional constraint of tax competition in indirect taxes for some products that are subject to cross-border shopping implies that a government, in its desire to implement an incentive-compatible tax-transfer policy, should rely on indirect taxation besides direct taxation, and whether indirect taxes should be di¤erentiated between goods which are subject to cross-border shopping and those goods which are not. The analysis incorporates cross-border shopping into the framework of Boadway and Pestieau (2003) , which itself is an extension of the Stiglitz'(1982) two-type optimal taxation model. Individuals are tied to their place of residence for work, but are mobile regarding the purchase of certain consumption goods.
The approach turns the model into a strategic tax competition framework in which the governments try to redistribute subject to their information constraints, and compete for cross-border shoppers.
We derive a number of results. First, the AS result holds even with competition for cross-border shoppers. In general, indirect taxation is not needed to increase e¢ ciency, so the argument for uniform indirect taxation remains valid. This result is independent of the nature of the competing countries.
In particular, asymmetries regarding the relative size of the countries, the government's relative welfare weights, or di¤erences in the skill distribution are not a¤ecting its validity. This …nding can be contrasted with the existing partial equilibrium models, such as Kanbur and Keen (1993) Finally, our approach is complementary to other studies that have introduced aspects of tax competition into optimal taxation models. Huber (1999) considers the interaction between optimal income taxation and the taxation of internationally mobile capital. Simula and Trannoy (2010) and Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2010) introduce labor mobility into the optimal taxation framework and study the resulting changes to the optimal tax schedule. Preferences are represented by the strictly concave utility function
which is separable in the sub-utility of consumption g(:; :) and labor l. Gross income of an individual of productivity i in country j is denoted by y j;i , and y j;i = l j;i w j;i where w denotes the wage rate. The net income is denoted by c j;i . There are two consumption goods, x and z, with producer prices set to one. Both goods can be bought in the two countries at the consumer price
where t j;k is the speci…c tax levied on good k = x; z, in country j. Transport costs for good x are prohibitively high, whereas good z can be bought in the neighboring country subject to transport costs. We call x the non-tradable and z the tradable good. The cross-border shopping decision is modeled following Hau ‡er (1996) . Transport costs for good z are quadratic in the volume of cross-border shopping. Denoting by z j;i; j the quantity of good z that is bought across the border, total transportation costs are K(z j;i; j ) = a 2 z 2 j;i; j , such that the relevant marginal transport costs are az j;i; j , a > 0.
1
Buying one more unit abroad will be preferred to shopping at home if the price abroad plus the marginal transport costs is less than the price in the country of residence, i.e., if t j;z + az j;i; j < t j;z . Note that the decision about whether, and how much, to buy abroad is the same for high and low 1 Wholesale transportation costs are assumed to be zero. 5 productivity individuals. Consequently, for given tax rates t j;z and t j;z , consumers are indi¤erent between buying at home or abroad at quantity
Since cross-border shopping is restricted to positive amounts, we have z j;i; j max 0; z j;i; j . By assumption, individuals always buy some amount of good z in their home country, such that z j;i; j < z j;i :
We focus on the welfare maximization problem of government j, noting that the other government j solves an analogous problem. It maximizes a
Utilitarian welfare function with welfare weights j;i
where utility has been rewritten using the indirect utility function f (:). The government's budget is
The …rst term of the government budget consists of the direct taxes or subsidies paid by, or to, the low productivity and high productivity individuals, The government's tax policy also has to be incentive-compatible. We consider downward incentive compatibility only. This condition is u h f (q j;z ; q j;z ; c j;h ) ; y j;h w j;h u h f (q j;z ; q j;z ; c j;l ) ; y j;l w j;h :
We also assume that the share of low productivity individuals is su¢ ciently large such that the optimal policy entails a positive labor supply from the low productivity types. Accordingly, the government's problem is to maximize (4) subject to (5) and (6) choosing y j;l ; y j;h ; c j;l ; c j;h and q j;z with the corresponding Lagrangean
The …rst order conditions are c j;l : j;l A j j;l @u l @f @f @c j;l j;l A j + j;l A j t j;z @z j;l @c j;l +
j;l A j t j;x @x j;l @c j;l @û h @f @f @c j;l = 0; are the derivatives of the compensated demand functions with respect to prices. This expression F j is at the heart of our further discussion of the potential equilibria. Note that for country j an analogous expression F j must hold in the equilibrium.
Symmetric countries
Consider …rst the case of symmetric countries. As usual in the literature, we set the tax on good x to zero in both countries, and also normalize the mass of 8 individuals in both countries to unity. Thus, A j = A j = 1; j;i = j;i = i ; j;i = j;i = i ; t j;x = t j;x = 0: Note that with t j;x = 0 the second term of F j in (10) disappears. Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium we have t j;z = t j;z = t z , and accordingly z j;i;j = z j;i; j = 0 and @z j;i;j @q j;z = @z j;i; j @q j;z = 0:
Expression (10) reduces to
The term in parentheses is negative, such that the equilibrium must entail
We summarize this result in our …rst proposition:
Proposition 1 If the two neighboring countries are symmetric, and both countries set the tax on the non-tradable good to zero, the symmetric tax policy equilibrium entails no tax on the tradable good in both countries.
Indirect taxation does not play a role in the e¢ cient redistributive tax policy of the two countries competing for cross-border shoppers. Since both indirect tax rates are set to zero, indirect taxation is also uniform. Thus, in a symmetric world with cross-border shopping, the AS result holds.
Asymmetric countries
Consider next the case of asymmetric countries. We do not distinguish between the di¤erent dimensions in which the countries may di¤er, but proceed very generally, allowing for di¤erent country sizes, di¤erent welfare weights, and for di¤erent shares of high and low productivity individuals. Moreover, we again set the tax on good x to zero in both countries. In the general asymmetric case we have the following result:
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium involving asymmetric countries with tax rates t j;x = t j;x = 0, both countries set t j;z = t j;z = 0:
Proof. First, note that t j;z = t j;z = 0 is compatible with (10) and the corresponding expression F j . We now show that no other combination of tax rates can be an equilibrium. Observe that t j;z < 0, i.e. a subsidy on good z, is never an optimal policy, irrespective of the neighboring country's policy or country characteristics. If t j;z < 0 in (10), then F j > 0, contradicting condition (10). The same follows directly from F j for t j;z < 0. Consider now t j;z > t j;z , such that z j;i;j = 0 and @z j;i;j @q j;z = 0: This implies
A j j;i t j;z @z j;i; j @q j;z (11)
which is only ful…lled for t j;z = 0 and therefore t j;z < 0. Since we know that neither country subsidizes z, an equilibrium with t j;z > t j;z can be ruled out. Note that the combination with t j;z and t j;z interchanged is completely analogous, such that an equilibrium with t j;z < t j;z can also be ruled out in the same way by considering F j . Finally, t j;z = t j;z > 0 can also be ruled out as an equilibrium, since it also implies (11), which requires t j;z = 0. This proves that only t j;z = t j;z = 0 is compatible with an equilibrium.
Given that the neighboring country sets t j;z = 0, country j has nothing to gain from lowering its tax t j;z below zero since this would imply handing out a subsidy to foreigners. Moreover, distorting relative prices between x and z has an additional negative a¤ect on welfare. This follows from the logic of the AS result. The government also has nothing to gain from increasing t j;z above zero. This would create cross-border shopping out of the country which implies a loss of revenues and also distorts relative prices. The optimal policy is therefore to set the tax for tradable goods to zero. Thus, in an open economy with cross-border shopping, the optimal redistributive policy does not rely on indirect taxes.
Thus, the baseline AS result holds in the general case of open economies with cross-border shopping. Despite the possibility to attract cross-border shoppers, indirect taxes cannot increase the e¢ ciency of the tax system, and tax rates should be equalized across goods at zero. Moreover, the irrelevance result of indirect taxation of Proposition 2 is valid independent of country size, populations structure in terms of population shares of high and low skilled, and of the utility weights assigned to high and low skilled individuals, respectively. This is in contrast to the partial equilibrium models of crossborder shopping, such as Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001) , where di¤erences in country characteristics are important determinants of tax rates and ‡ows of cross-border shoppers in the equilibrium.
Equilibria with indirect taxation
Our analysis has so far set the tax rate on non-tradable goods t x to zero in both countries. In practice, countries typically rely on a mix of direct and indirect taxes. The application of such a tax mix can typically be traced down to tax administration or tax evasion reasons, cf. Boadway et al. (1994) , among others. In the closed economy situation, setting t x > 0 is irrelevant for the AS result, and t x = t z can be derived as the optimal tax policy, since this is just equivalent to the corresponding increases in income taxes, such that uniform indirect taxation continues to be optimal. We now investigate, whether this remains the case with cross-border shopping.
We return to the symmetric setting of Section 3, setting A j = A j = 1; j;i = j;i = i ; and j;i = j;i = i , but consider the case in which indirect taxes on the non-tradable good are positive, i.e., t j;x = t j;x = t x > 0. We focus again on a symmetric equilibrium with t j;z = t j;z = t z , and thus z j;i;j = z j;i; j = 0 and @z j;i;j @q j;z = @z j;i; j @q j;z = 0: Expression (10) then implies
From this we directly have our next proposition:
Proposition 3 If t j;x = t j;x = t x > 0, both countries choose t z < t x in a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from (12) and the fact that P Proof. An information-constrained social planner maximizing joint welfare of both countries would set t z = t x in both countries, as follows directly from the AS result. The equilibrium entails di¤erentiated indirect taxes and thus a lower level of welfare.
Apparently, if indirect taxes play an important role in the tax systems of the countries under consideration, tax competition for cross-border shopping has the potential to lower welfare, since it induces tax di¤erentiation which generates additional distortions without improving redistribution.
Next, we consider the possibility that only one country has an exogenous positive tax rate on the non-tradable good. This amounts to the case in which t j;x > t j;x = 0. In this case, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 If t j;x > t j;x = 0, an equilibrium must entail t j;z > t j;z > 0.
Proof. If t j;x > 0 and t j;x = 0, the expression (10) now di¤ers between country j and country j. They are given as
A j j;i t j;z @z j;i;j @q j;z = 0;
X i=l;h A j j;i t j;z @z j;i;j @q j;z + X i=l;h A j j;i z j;i; j + X i=l;h A j j;i t j;z @z j;i; j @q j;z = 0:
The following constellations are potential equilibria: i) t j;z > t j;z = 0; ii) t j;z = t j;z > 0; iii) t j;z > t j;z = 0; iv) t j;z > t j;z > 0; v) t j;z < 0, or t j;z < 0; vi) t j;z > t j;z > 0: Substituting these possibilities into (13) and (14) shows that vi) is the only combination compatible with the equilibrium. Given that an equilibrium exists, it entails t j;z > t j;z > 0:
Indirect taxation in one country results in rate di¤erentiation in both countries. Moreover, the existence of indirect taxation can trigger indirect taxation in the other country, even if this country would not rely on indirect taxes in the absence of the possibility of cross border shopping.
Finally, we again consider a regulation that requires both countries to use uniform taxation in this asymmetric case. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Assume that t j;x > 0 and t j;x = 0 for exogenous reasons.
Starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium derived above with t j;x > t j;z > t j;z > 0, requiring both countries to set uniform taxes, such that t j;x = t j;z > 0 and t j;x = t j;z = 0 reduces welfare in country j and can reduce welfare in country j.
Proof. Consider …rst country j. We consider the e¤ect on its welfare in two steps. First, setting t j;z = 0 reduces welfare, since it is not the best response. Second, increase the tax on good z in country j to t j;z = t j;x has no e¤ect on welfare, since this increases the number of cross-border shoppers, but these do not pay taxes in country j. Thus the total e¤ect on welfare in country j is negative. Consider now country j. Again we proceed in two steps. First, increasing t j;z to t j;z = t j;x , reduces welfare of country j, since this is a deviation from its best response. Second, the reduction of t j;z to t j;z = 0 has two e¤ects on welfare, which both originate in the increased tax di¤erence and the corresponding increase in cross-border shopping. On the one hand, individuals are better o¤, because they bene…t from the lower price in country j. On the other hand, the reduction in tax revenues in country j reduces welfare. Unless the e¤ect of lower prices in country j dominates the e¤ect on tax revenues and the e¤ect of deviating from the best response, welfare in country j also decreases.
This proposition illustrates that requiring uniform taxation must not necessarily be bene…cial, but will depend on the degree and nature of heterogeneity. In particular, with di¤erent exogenous tax rates, a regulation that requires countries to set uniform tax rates can reduce welfare. Note, however, that the above argument relied on t j;x = 0, since, with positive indirect taxes, the low tax country not only has the negative e¤ect of deviating from its best response, but also a positive e¤ect on tax revenues. Thus, in the more general case, the e¤ects are even less clear cut as in the examined benchmark 14 case.
6 Discussion and conclusion suggests that, in a world with uniform positive rates on non-tradable goods, rate di¤erentiation for products subject to cross-border shopping should not be allowed. However, if there are di¤erences in the rates on non-tradable goods, according to Proposition 5, these will translate into di¤erent rates on tradable goods. This tax gap, however, is smaller relative to the non-tradable goods. In such a situation, a ban of tax di¤erentiation results the consumption distortion within countries but also leads to higher tax di¤erences in the tradable goods and to more wasteful cross-border shopping. As indicated by Proposition 6 banning rate di¤erentiation within countries can lead to welfare losses for both countries. Thus, if there are substantial di¤erences in the standard indirect tax rates across Member States, a case may be made for leaving some scope for rate di¤erentiation. Consequently, the more standard rates are harmonized across EU Member States, the less scope there should be for individual Member States to di¤erentiate their rates of those goods and services that are subject to cross-border shopping. In summary, the range of products to which Member States can apply VAT rate di¤erentiation, and the size of the deviations from the standard rates should be rather limited, and these limitations should be more restrictive, when standard rates are more harmonized between Member States. 2 Our framework makes several simplifying assumptions which need to be kept in mind when drawing policy conclusions. The incentive to engage in cross-border shopping was modeled to be independent of the individual labor supply decision. This allows a proper comparison with the AS benchmark. Of course, once the labor supply decision is connected to cross-border shopping activities, additional aspects for optimal tax policy can arise. This would open an additional channel to a¤ect incentive compatibility, and the optimal policy would additionally take these a¤ects into account. The analysis has also made individuals completely immobile regarding their place of work, but partially mobile as consumers. In reality, mobility of workers also plays an important role for the optimal design of tax systems consisting of elements of direct and indirect taxation. Our approach is therefore complementary to studies that focus on the mobility of workers for the design of optimal direct taxation only, but do not take mobile consumers into account. An encompassing policy appraisal should also consider such additional aspects.
